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Labor Dispute Disqualification Under the Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Act
Soon after the enactment of the Federal Social Security Act in
1935,1 all the states2 and the three territories enacted legislation
which provided for the payment of benefits to the unemployed
worker. Into each plan was written a provision excepting those
workers unemployed due to a labor dispute. Since the enactment
of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law in 1936, relatively
little litigation has involved the labor dispute disqualification.
Although the cases that have come before the courts and the admin-
istrative bodies have been few, the total number of claimants
affected has nevertheless been relatively high.4 Claims involving
' Chapter 9 sub-chapter C of Internal Revenue Code as amended, formerly
49 Stat. 626, C. 531, Title III (1935)2 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 214, subd. A (1940), ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN.
§51-5-4(d) (1949), ARIZ. CODE ANN. §56-1005d (Cum. Supp. 1947), ARK.
DIG. STAT. 1089 (Cum. Supp. 1944), CAL. GEN. LAWS act 8780(d), §56a
(1944); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 167A §5(d) (Cum. Supp. 1947); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §7508(3) (1949); Del.: 2 C.C.H. UNEMPLOYMENT SEV., §4027, D.C.
CODE §460310(f) (Cum. Supp. 1948); FLA. STAT. §443.06(4) (1943), GA.
CODE ANN. §54-610(d) (Cum. Supp. 1947), HAWAII REV. LAws §4231(d)
(1945), 1947 IDAHO LAWS, c. 269, §66(j), ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 45.134(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1947), IND. ANN. STAT. §52-1539c (Burns Cum. Supp. 1947); IOWA
CODE §96.5(4) (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §44-706(d) (Cum. Supp. 1947);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §341.360(1) (1948); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4434.4(d)
(Cum. Supp. 1947); ME. REv. STAT. c. 24, §5(d) (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAWS art. 95A, §5(d) (1939), MASS. ANN. LAws c. 151A, §25b (1942) ; 1943
Mich. Laws, c. 246, §29(c), MINN. STAT. ANN. §268.09, subd. 1(6) (West
1945), Miss. CODE ANN. §7379(d) (1943); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §9431/II(a)
(1939), MONT. REV. CODE-s ANN. §3033.8(d) (Supp. 1939), as amended, Laws
1941, c. 164, §3; NEB. REv. STAT. §480628(d) (1943); NEV. COMP. LAWS ANN.,
§2825.05(d) (Supp. 1945), N.H. REV. LAws, c. 218, §4) (1942); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §43, 21-5(d) (Cum. Supp. 1948; N.M. STAT. ANN., §57-805(d) (1941);
N.Y. LABOR LAW §592(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN., §96-14d (1943); N.D. REv.
CODE §52-0602(4) (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN., §1345-6d (1948); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 40, §215(d) (1941), ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN., §126-705(d) (Supp.
1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §802(d) (Cum. Supp. 1948), R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 284, §7(4) (1938), S.C. CODE ANN. §7035-85(d) (1942); S.D. CODE
§17.0830(4) (1939), TENN. CODE ANN., §6901.29E (Williams Cum. Supp.
1948), Tnx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5221b-3 (d) (1947) ; UTAH CODE ANN.,
§42-2a-5(d) (1943); VT. REV. STAT., §5379 IV (1947); VA. CODE ANN.,
§1887(97) (d) (1942), WASH. REV. STAT. ANN., §9998-2"15 (Supp. 1945);
WVA. CODE ANN., §2366(78) (1943); WIS. STAT., §108.04(10) (1947); Wyo.
Comxr. STAT. ANN., §54-105B II (1945).
'116 Ohio Laws Pt. II 286 (1936)
' Records indicate in 1948 that 6,957 claims were disallowed because claim-
ant was found "not capable or available" and 1,039 claims disallowed due to
labor dispute. In 1947, claims disallowed because "not capable or available"
amounted to 8,297 and 2,002 due to labor dispute. In 1946, claims disallowed
because "not capable or available" numbered 8,514 and 29,506 due to labor
dispute. In 1945, claims disallowed because "not capable or available" num-
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the labor dispute disqualification have had such significance that
the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation has adopted a
special procedure for processing such claims.5
Many factors have contributed to reduce the amount of litiga-
hon in this area. Possibly the most significant has been the pros-
perity which has seadily increased since 1939 and particularly
through the war production period. Significant also were the "no
strike-no lockout" pledges adopted by labor and management on
December 23, 1941, upon the suggestion of President Roosevelt.
Regardless of what the future may hold, an analysis of the labor
dispute disqualification is pertinent today because such disqualifi-
cation has an undeniable dynamic effect on our economy.
The origin of the labor dispute disqualification is found in the
British National Insurance Act of 1911.6 There it was stipulated
that any insured worker who lost employment as the result of a
stoppage of work which was due to a trade dispute was disqualified
for benefits during the period of such stoppage. Persons finding
themselves in such a position were thus left to finance themselves
and to maintain their position in the dispute on their own financial
resources.
Curiously, the basic requirements established in the Federal
Social Security Act,7 to which state conformity was required, did
not contain a labor dispute disqualification clause. However, in
various draft bills prepared by the Social Security Administration
for the guidance of the states, there did appear such a provision.
Many explanations have been proffered for the inclusion of this
disqualification. The more important of these have been8 (1) Un-
bered 14,386 and 16,086 due to labor dispute. See, Chart of New Claims
allowed or disallowed at initial determination by office, under the Ohio Un-
employment Compensation Law for years 1948, 1947, 1946, 1945, published
by Division of Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Com-
pensation, Columbus, Ohio.
"When a claim for benefits is filed, there is indicated on the face of the
application whether or not a labor dispute is in progress at the employer's
premises. If, however, such fact is not indicated, there is a double check in
that the employer, following Regulation 411.2 of Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation, must file within 24 hours after cessation of work due to an
alleged labor dispute a notice setting forth date when cessation of work began.
Upon the Bureau's request, an employer must furnish the names and Social
Security account number of all workers ordinarily attached to the establish-
ment.
As the Initial Determination Section receives the applications for benefits,
all claims marked labor dispute are separated and collected. The facts of the
alleged dispute are submitted to a legal advisor for opinion. Based upon such
legal opinion, the claim is either allowed or denied.
Unemployment Insurance Act of 1911, 1 and 2 GEa. V, c. 55.
See su.pra note 1.
Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Ldbor Disputes, 49
YALu L.J. 461 (1940), Note, 49 COLO. L. REv. 550 (1949).
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employment insurance is designed to insure against those risks
which are economic in nature and non-voluntary; (2) If benefits
were payable to employees involved in labor disputes, such conflicts
would be prolonged with resulting loss to our economy; (3) The
added problems of rate making and calculation of the risk and the
resulting costs would cause a collapse of the entire scheme of social
legislation; (4) The State should maintain a neutral position and
not aid in financing one of the parties to the dispute.
Ohio General Code Section 1345-6-d (1) provides "... no indi-
vidual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the dura-
tion of any period of unemployment with respect to which the
Administrator finds that such individual:
(1) lost his employment or has left his employment by
reason of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) at the
factory, establishment, or other premises at which he
was employed, as long as such labor dispute contin-
ues;. ." (emphasis supplied).
Except for the amendment of October 1, 1941,0 when the phrase
"labor dispute" was inserted in place of the word "strike" there
has been no change in this provision since the adoption of the
Unemployment Compensation Act in 1936. As will be subsequently
indicated, the substitution seems to have broadened the area of
disqualification.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A LABOR DISPUTE?
Following the practice of the majority of states,10 the Ohio
Legislature has not defined the term, labor dispute, nor is the leg-
islative intent in any way indicated.
Unfortunately, the issue of what constitutes a labor dispute
under the Ohio Act has never been squarely presented to the courts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has implied, however, in Baker v. Pow-
hatan Minsng Company,- that the definition of a labor dispute as
contained in the National Labor Relations Act 2 should be followed
in determining whether such a dispute exists under our act.13
119 Ohio Laws 821, 837 (1941).
Only Alabama defines labor dispute in its Unemployment Compensation
Law. 26 AA. CODE, sec. 214A incorporates the Norris-LaGuardia Act defini-
tion of the term.
"146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E. 2d 714 (1946)
-49 STAT. 449; 29 U.S.C. §§151-166 (1935) Many state courts have
adopted the definition of labor dispute contained in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. See e.g., Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.
2d 810 (1941), Sandoval v. Industrial Commission, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P. 2d
930 (1942), Dallas Fuel Co. v. Home, 230 Iowa 1148, 300 N.W 303 (1941);
Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W 2d 929 (1940); Huerta v. E. Ragens-
burg & Sons, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fla., par. 8079 (1944).
"In the Baker case at page 610, the court said, "The mere statement of the
facts clearly shows that the situation presented in the instant case was not
240 [Vol. 10
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Although the Baker case arose in 1941 before the amendment and
therefore involved the strike disqualification, the court-probably
aware of the 1941 amendment 4-- accepted the broad definition of
a labor dispute. In subsequent decisions, both the Board of Review
and the Administrator have yielded to the precedent established in
the Baker case.15
Some'basis can be found for the contention that the definition
of a labor dispute in the National Labor Relations Act was intended
to be adopted and applied in the Social Security Act. Chapter 9,
sub-chapter C, section 1603 (5) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code
as amended (formerly Title IX of the Social Security Act) deals
with the so-called "refusal of work section." This requires:
Compensation shall not be denied in such State to any other-
wise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work un-
der any of the following conditions: (A) If the position
offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or other
dispute... I
Since Congress did not define the term "labor dispute" in this
refusal of work section, it is quite possible that it may have intended
the term, when used in this latter act, to have the same meaning
which it had already explicitly placed upon it in the Norris-
LaGuardia-0 and the National Labor Relations ActsY.1 From this
it would follow that when the Ohio Legislature adopted this re-
quired clause in Ohio General Code Section 1345-6-3 (2) the term
"labor dispute" was intended to carry the same meaning adopted
by Congress. Otherwise, Ohio would not be complying with the
Social Security Act. Since the State Legislature would not have
intended conflicting meanings to be attached to the term "labor
dispute" in different parts of the act, it would follow that the broad
meaning of the term was adopted in the labor dispute disqualifica-
tion provision as well as in the refusal of work provision.
It is significant that in a dictum the Ohio Supreme Court appears
to have adopted the definition contained in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act even though thirteen years earlier it had developed a
different definition of this same term in a labor injunction case.,,
In the La Fravce"c case, which is still followed in Ohio,2 a labor
only a 'labor dispute' . . " The court's quotation of labor dispute refers to
the previously cited National Labor Relations Act definition of the term.
" See su'pra note 9.
'See, e.g., Abbott v. Globe Wernicke Co., Board of Review Appeals Docket
No. 59035 (1948); Dicken v. East Shore Machine Products Co., B'd of Rev.
Appeals Docket No. 67357 (1948); Douglas v. Cleveland Co-operative Stove
Co., Board of Review Apeals Docket No. 85207 (1948).
"'49 STAT. 640 (1935), 26 U.S.C. §1603 (1946).
'- See supra, note 12.
's La France Electrical Construction and Supply Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N.E. 897 (1923)
' See supra, note 18.
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dispute exists only when the parties involved in a controversy
are in an employer-employee relationship. The term as used in the
National Labor Relations Act2' is not restricted to a controversy
between an employer and his employees. Under either definition
of the term there must exist a controversy arising out of an insist-
ence by one party for acceptance or abrogation of some condition of
employment and a resistance by the other party to these demands.
This insistence and resistance by the parties generally results in a
withholding of work. However, the presence of a work stoppage
does not necessarily indicate a labor dispute.
Often it would seem that neither the Board of Review nor the
Administrator recognizes the prerequisite finding of a controversy
but looks only to the presence of a stoppage of work in determining
whether or not a labor dispute exists.
Thus in the Globe-Werneke case,' 2 an employer unilaterally
changed a bonus plan.2 3 This action resulted in decreased earnings
of the employees. After approximately three months operation
under the changed bonus plan, production began to decrease in key
departments with the consequent interruption in the flow of ma-
-terials and resultant shortages in some departments and bottlenecks
in others. Soon disruption of production progressed to the stage
where the company felt it necessary to lay off several hundred of
its employees. Both the employees and their union denied taking
any concerted action to effect such a decline in production and
there was no evidence that a formal strike was voted at any of
the numerous union meetings. There had been some preliminary
negotiations between the union and the employer concerning the
bonus plan.
In concluding that a labor dispute existed, the Board of Review
stated, "Conceivably a labor dispute may exist without a strike;
but when a labor dispute progresses to a point where the employees
by concerted action bring about a cessation of work or a situation
where they fail to work at their customary rate of speed, in the
effort to enforce their demands, then all the requisite elements of
a strike are present. Such strike falls within the inclusive term,
labor dispute." Although the Board casually refers to the exist-
ence of a labor dispute, the facts leave grave doubt as to whether
there was a controversy at all. The pitfall of looking only to the
presence of a stoppage of work without a finding of a pre-existing
2Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E. 2d 934 (1940), cert. dented,
312 U.S. 690 (1941).
"See supra, note 12.
'See supra, note 15.
"In November, 1946, the National Wage Stabilization Board held that by
substituting the Divisional Incentive Plan for the Incentive Bonus Plan the
company had violated the National Wage Stabilization Act."
[Vol. 10
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controversy seems apparent in this decision.
Where employee unions were involved in a jurisdictional dis-
pute and the negotiations culminated in a work stoppage, the Board
of Review, finding that a strike existed, disqualified the claimants. 24
The case arose in 1941 before the amendment which substituted
labor dispute for strike. Although the Board may have been in
error in classifying a jurisdictional dispute as a strike, it is clear
that such a controversy is a labor dispute under the National Labor
Relations Act.25
Any doubt concerning the determination of the period of ineli-
gibility has been expressly met by the Legislature. The act specifi-
cally states that this disqualification endures "as long as such labor
dispute continues." Therefore, it follows that upon the termination
of the labor dispute, the claimants are no longer disqualified under
this provision. Many times employment is not resumed immedi-
ately and there is a delay in employment subsequent to the termina-
tion of the labor dispute. It might be contended that so long as the
continued unemployment is proximately related to the labor dispute,
the claimant remains unemployed due to a labor dispute. However,
such a view would seem to be inconsistent with the express terms
of the statute.
The sale of the plant, factory, or establishment has been held to
terminate the disqualification.26 However, this would seem to be
true only where the employment relationship or labor dispute is
terminated simultaneously with the sale. If the employee effectively
removes himself from employee status while the labor dispute is in
progress and accepts other permanent employment, the labor dis-
pute so far as it affects his disqualification is now terminated.2 7
This is in accordance with the language of the statute which con-
tains the phrase, ".... at which he was employed..."28
It is expressly provided in the act that benefits will not be denied
where the termination of employment is due to a lockout.29 The
statute does not define a lockout. As a matter of fact, such excep-
' Hand v. Newark Stove Co., B'd. of Rev. Appeals Docket No. 14140 (1942);
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 1980.07.
' In U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), a jurisdictional strike was
held to be a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act; a fortiori, a labor
dispute under National Labor Relations Act which incorporates the same
definition of the term.
- Dicken v. East Shore Machine Products Co., supra, note 15; but see,
Williams v. T.W.A., Board of Review Appeals Docket No. 65676 (1948)
_ Glaser v. Superior Pattern Co., Board of Review Appeals Docket No.
49469; Ben. Ser. Vol. 11, No. 10 (Ohio-R-1948).
-l Omo GEN. CODE, §1345-6-d(1).
Seven states specifically exclude lockout from the disqualifying effect of
a labor dispute in the Unemployment Compensation Insurance Act. These
states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
and West Virginia.
1949]
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tion has rarely been found by the Board of Review. 30 This does
not mean, however, that the issue is not often raised by a union.
Recently in the Globe-Wernicke case, supra, such a position was
taken by the claimants. During the lay-off period, the employer
repeatedly published notices that work would be available if the
union would notify the management that it did not approve of a
work slow-down. In answering the claimants' contention that the
employer had locked out the employees, the Board said, "The com-
pany's closing of its plant, once the work stoppage by the employees
had begun, was not a lockout but, to the contrary, was a protective
measure only."
A lockout was defined as a "cessation of furnishing of work to
employees in an effort to get for the employer more desirable
terms."31 One member of the Board dissented on the ground that
a lockout existed since the employer's action was arbitrary and
was not a "protective measure." The dissent also indicated that
in applying the disqualification, the merits of the dispute are not to
be considered and that logically when determining whether a lock-
out exists, the merits of the lockout should not be in issue either.
It would seem that the Ohio Legislature and the Board of Re-
view, in treating a lockout as parallel with a labor dispute, have
overlooked a fundamental difference between the terms. A labor
dispute, even though broadly construed, may or may not exist prior
to a lockout or a strike. Both of these latter terms, strike and lock-
out, merely describe the manner in which an interruption of work
is effected. There need be no looking to the "merits" of the labor
dispute when determining whether a strike or lockout exists; there
need be only a review of the sequence of events preceding the work
stoppage to determine which party's action is the proximate cause
of the work stoppage which has in turn resulted in unemployment.
WHAT COMPRISES A FACTORY, ESTABLISHMENT,
OR OTHER PREMISES?
As specified in the act, in order to constitute a disqualification
a labor dispute must be at the factory,3 2 establishment,33 or other
'Dissenting opinion Abbott v. Globe Wernicke, supra, note 15, Board
Member Roberts states, "In applying the disqualification, the Board has never,
to the writer's recollection, recognized any condition which caused workers to
leave work in concerted action when it found a labor dispute existed and
workers were unemployed by reason of a labor dispute (other than a lockout).
In other words, regardless of the ruthlessness of the employer in imposing
conditions upon the workers, if the workers left their employment as a means
of preventing such impositions, the disqualification was applied."
IThis definition is taken from Iron Molder's Union No. 125 v. Allis Chal-
mers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (1909)
'Webster's New International Dictionary (1948) defines factory as, "A
building, or collection of buildings, usually with its equipment or plant, appro-
priated to the manufacture of goods."
244 [Vol. 10
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premises at which the claimant was employed. No Ohio cases have
been found which involve the construction of the first and third
terms. Only the second term, establishment, has been construed in
Ohio. Generally, the issue has arisen when a labor dispute has
developed in one business unit resulting in unemployment in an-
other unit owned and operated by the same employer.
An examination of decisions here and elsewhere reveals that
two factors have played a determining role in resolving this issue.
They are (1) common employer status among the two or more busi-
ness units concerned; and (2) interdependence or functional in-
tegrality between the units.
The question of common employer status has not been squarely
faced in Ohio. However, in Agee v. Republic Steel Corporatwn,34
a strike in the captive coal mines of the corporation resulted in
unemployment in the Youngstown Steel Mills owned and operated
by Republic Steel. The Referee held the unemployment was due
to "lack of work," in that the labor dispute admittedly was not
within the steel industry but in the coal industry. Apparently, the
facts that an adequate supply of coal was on hand at all times and
that the employer anticipated a coal shortage were controlling.
Although this decision fails to indicate clearly whether a holding
company and its subsidiaries are to be treated as one establishment,
it is significant that emphasis was placed on the finding that the
labor dispute was in the coal industry rather than in the steel indus-
try. Absent the necessity of finding a common employer status, it
would seem that if there exists functional integrality between the
business units a finding of a labor dispute in the same industry is
unnecessary.
Nevertheless, in an earlier case, Denger v. U. S. Steel Corpora-
tionf,5 the Board of Review declared that a holding company and
its various subsidiaries will not be considered as an establishment.
There a brakeman employed by the Lake Terminal Railroad Com-
pany lost his employment by reason of a general strike in the steel
industry which caused a work stoppage at National Tube Steel
Company. The Lake Terminal Railroad's sole function consisted
of servicing the National Tube Steel Company; both corporations
were subsidiaries of the U. S. Steel Corporation. Recgnizing such
facts, the Board found the claimant eligible for benefits, asserting
that, "While both companies are subsidiaries of the same parent
company, they are separate establishments. In view of the fact
' Webster, ibid., defines establishment as, "A permanent place of residence
or business; hence, such a place with its grounds, furnishings, staff of em-
ployees, etc."
' Board of Review Appeals Docket No. 49847, 903 Ref. 48 (1948)
Board of Review Appeals Docket No. 38317 (1947).
1949]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that claimant was employed by an employer other than one involved
in the labor dispute..."
From the above, it would seem that the Board of Review
requires a common employer-employee status as a prerequisite
before the units will be considered as one establishment. Other
jurisdictions indicate the necessity of showing common employer-
employee status.3 6
The introduction of functional integrality as a factor when
determining what constitutes an establishment has brought forth
divergent views among the courts. If two or more business units
are held to- constitute an establishment because interdependence or
functional integrality exists between them, disallowance of many
otherwise eligible claimants whose unemployment is involuntary
is readily facilitated. The concept of functional integrality is not
unique in unemployment compensation insurance since it has been
accepted by both administrative tribunals and courts when de-
termining employer-employee relationships under other types of
socio-economic legislation.3 7 There seems to be a tendency toward
viewing all the various installations of a business enterprise as
one economic unit rather than categorizing the many parts in-
dependently
A more restrictive view refuses to accept functional integrality
between the business units as a factor in determining an establish-
ment.38 The proponents of this view contend that Congress and
the state legislatures intended a liberal construction to be applied
when interpreting the terms of this legislation. The adherence to
a liberal construction permits the participation of a greater number
of unemployed in benefits. A liberal construction a fortiori necessi-
tates a narrow interpretation of the term, establishment. It is also
pointed out that terms used in a statute are intended to carry their
ordinary meaning. Since the ordinary meaning of an establishment
is a place of business other than those indicated by the word fac-
'Ben. Ser. Vol. 11, No. 8 (Cal.-R-1947), Ben. Cer. Vol. 11, No. 9 (La.-
A.-1947), Ben. Ser. Vol. 2, No. 2 (Mass.-A.-1940); Ben. Ser. Vol. 2, No. 7
(N.Y.-A.-1939), Ben. Ser. Vol. 4, No. 6 (Ore.-A.-1941).
'Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); N.L.R.B. v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1940)
'See Roberts dissenting in Diesel Wemmer case snfra note 42, "The pur-
pose of the legislation is to pay unemployment compensation benefits and to
ameliorate the consequences of widespread unemployment. Such compensation
is payable to unemployed workers with certain exceptions. To bring claimants
within such exceptions, it is necessary to strain at the meaning of the lan-
guage of the statute and to read into the act exceptions with regard to 'inte-
grated industry,' which are not mentioned anywhere in the legislation. To say
the least, this would result in a narrow rather than a liberal construction of
the meaning of the statute." Cf. Roberts in majority opinion, Adams v. North
Electric Manufacturing Co. infra note 45.
[Vol. 10
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tory,39 "the courts would not be justified in construing establish-
ment as meaning functional integrality and general unity of the
business of a large corporation with its many and varying units
of industry." 40
As to the intent of the Ohio Legislature, it is somewhat doubt-
ful if a liberal construction is any longer contemplated. Section
1345-33 of Ohio General Code, which provided for a liberal con-
struction when applying the act, has been repealed.4 1 However, at
the time the Board of Review first accepted the more comprehen-
sive functional integrality concept, this section was still in effect.
Whatever may have been the legislative intent, the Board of
Review in Bradford v. Deisel-Wemmer Gilbert Corporation42 fol-
lowed the decisions of Wisconsin 3 and Michigan 44 which, respec-
tively, espoused functional integrality or synchronized coordination
among business units as the dominant factor in determining an
establishment. In a subsequent decision,45 the Board reaffirmed this
position by finding that a Mt. Gilead plant was solely dependent
upon a Galion plant for its supply of basic materials and therefore
the Mt. Gilead plant was part of the same establishment when a
labor dispute at Galion caused the unemployment at Mt. Gilead.
The Board also stated that this functional integrality or inter-
dependence could be removed during the progress of the labor dis-
pute at such time as the Mt. Gilead plant should be able to secure
an adequate supply of materials from outside sources, enabling it
to recall its workers. But, the Board went on to say that this inte-
grality or interdependence, once removed, could not be replaced
subsequently should the outside source of materials prove inadequate
and unemployment result. Such unemployment, said the Board,
would then be "by reason of lack of work due to a shortage of
materials and not because of the labor dispute." It would seem
that contra to the Board's position, functional integrality could
be resumed once the economic interdependence has been estab-
lished.
' General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 55 A. 2d 732 (1947); C.C.H., U.I. Serv.,
Conn., par. 8173.
"Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Martin (1948), C.C.H., U.I. Serv.,
Ala., par. 8148.
"122 Ohio Laws 239, 240 (1947). However, the clause has been re-enacted
Am. S.B. 142, effective August 22, 1949.
'Board of Rev. Appeals Docket No. 12811 (1942)
,Hamkiss v. Industrial Commission and Nash Kelvinator and Spielmann
v. Industrial Commission and Nash Kelvinator, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W 1
(1940).
" Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941), 135 A.L.R.
900 (1941)
' Adams v. North Electric Manufacturing Co., Board of Review Appeals
Docket No. 74836 (1948).
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One of the factors often considered when determining the exist-
ence of functional integrality has been the physical proximity be-
tween the business units. In the Deisel-Wemmer, North Electric
Manufacturing Company,47 Chrysler,48 and Nash-Kelvinator49 cases,
the distances were 30, 14, 11, and 40 miles, respectively. Appar-
ently, the importance of the distance is not controlled by the actual
mileage but by the effect that such distance would naturally have on
the economic interdependence between the separate business units.50
Even though the Board of Review has adopted the functional
integrality concept, it has not, however, broadened its meaning to
limits followed in other jurisdictions under different legislation.
There remains the hurdle of finding a common employer status
among the business units. This prerequisite remains an impedi-
ment to a finding that a corporate holding company with its various
subsidiary operating companies constitutes a single establishment,
even where the interdependence between the units is clear.
Nevertheless, without regard to common employer status, the
Board of Review, following the strict wording of the provision,
has taken a unique position concerning the situs of a dispute. The
Board has held that the disqualification is not restricted to those
employees who are employed by the employer involved in the dispute
but includes all those whose labor is at the factory, establishment,
or other premises, regardless of the identity of the employer. A
check weighman, an employee of the United Mine Workers of
America, performed his duties on the property of a coal company
and was thrown out of work when the mine shut down because of
a labor dispute between the union and the coal operator. The
Board held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits even though
he was not involved in-the dispute.51
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP NECESSARY BETWEEN THE LABOR DISPUTE
AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT
The finding that a labor dispute exists at the factory, establish-
ment, or other premises is not of itself sufficient to disqualify a
particular claimant. Under the Ohio Act, as in all states, a causal
relationship must be found between the labor dispute and the claim-
ant's unemployment. The Ohio act provides that an employee is
disqualified if he has "lost his employment or has left his employ-
ment by reason of a labor dispute . ." (emphasis supplied). The
" See supra, note 40.
"7 See supra, note 45.
'
8 See supra, note 44.
"See supra, note 43.
"For a contra conclusion, see note, 49 Col. L. Rev. 550 at 558 (1949).
" Risk v. United Mine Workers, 1714 Ref. 43 (1943).
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COMMENTS
Board of Review in determining whether a causal relationship
exists appears to have adopted the "proximate cause" test.52
Any discussion concerning the application of the disqualifica-
tion to an employee who has been discharged before the labor
dispute occurred would appear superfluous. Nevertheless, the
Board of Review has suggested that if a labor dispute arises out
of the discharge of an employee, such employee may be disqualified
if he participates in the concerted action taken by his fellow em-
ployees to challenge the discharge.5 3 Although the result reached
by the Board may be acceptable, it is submitted that in this situa-
tion the claimant could be more appropriately disqualified under
the "available for work" provision.5 4 When there are no causes
other than the labor dispute which might be capable of causing un-
employment, the casual relationship between such labor dispute
and unemployment is usually obvious from the facts.5 5 However,
a more challenging problem of causal relationship is presented when
other operational facts exist simultaneously with the labor dispute,
which facts standing alone could precipitate unemployment. In
tlus latter situation a more careful analysis of the sequence of op-
erational facts must be made in order to determine which has been
the proximate cause of the unemployment. Logically if the labor
dispute occurs subsequent to the unemployment, it should not be
categorized as a proximate cause until such time as employment
would be available if it were not for the labor dispute.
This rationale is supported by the Board of Review in Hoffman
v. Vitrified P'oducts Company case.56 There a manufacturer of
"hot tops," which were used exclusively by the steel industry, in
reducing his operations pending settlement of a steel strike laid
off the claimant. During the period of limited production a labor
dispute resulting in a strike developed between the manufacturer
and his employees. The Board of Review declared the claimant
eligible for benefits from the date of lay-off until the termination of
the steel strike; but disqualified him from the date of cessation of
the steel strike until termination of the labor dispute.
If in the above case the labor dispute had involved the claimant's
employer undoubtedly the Board would have found that the claim-
'E.g., Jones v. Pipe Machinery Co., Board of Review Apeals Docket No.
63960 (1948), Hoffman v. Vitrified Products Co., Board of Review Appeals
Docket No. 44358 (1947); Abazia v. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 12031-
Ref.-47, Appeals Docket No. 39825 (1947).
' Jones v. Pipe Machinery Co., supra, note 52.
' Ohio General Code Section 1345-6-a(4).
'In Williams v. T.W.A., Board of Review Appeals Docket No. 65676,
claimant reported back from vacation but was unable to resume work due to
termination of operations pending a labor dispute. Board held that claimant's
unemployment was due to a labor dispute.
I See supra, note 52.
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ant's unemployment was proximately caused by a labor dispute at
the factory, establishment, or other premises.5 7 This would be true
regardless of whether the claimant had participated in the dispute
or whether he received any benefits from it.
Other states except claimants from the disqualification if they
have not "participated in" or "financed" or are not "directly in-
terested" in the dispute or do not belong to a grade or class of em-
ployees any of whose members participate in, finance, or are di-
rectly interested in the dispute. These exceptions tend to person-
alize the disqualification thereby limiting it more sharply to those
employees voluntarily unemployed.
CONCLUSION
The broad purpose of unemployment compensation legislation
is to remove or shift a portion of the burdens which fall on work-
men as a result of adverse business and industrial conditions over
which they have little or no contro?.
The legislature in adopting the labor dispute disqualification
may have had in mind any one or all of the suggested reasons at
the beginning of this comment. Regardless of the reasons accepted,
there is implicit in each an underlying thesis that there should be
a causal relationship between the labor dispute and the unemploy-
ment. The terms "factory," "establishment," and "other premises"
were used to introduce objectivity in determining causal relation.
Application of the disqualification seems at times to have exceeded
the underlying premise. Acceptance of the broad definition of a
labor dispute and the functional integration concept widens the
scope of the disqualification. Even so, it is believed that both these
established interpretations are sound. To limit them properly,
legislative action seems unnecessary. If application of the dis-
qualification, to claimants not obviously participating in the labor
dispute is based on a determination whether the dispute has proxi-
mately caused their unemployment the desired result may be
reached.
Jack W. Tracy
See, e.g., Abazia v. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., supra, note 52; Abbot
v. Globe-Wernicke, supra, note 15.
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